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Abstract 
This letter advances the hypothesis that persistent inequality affects 
cultural traits and undermines social capital. We use blood donation 
data at the local level in Southern Spain to document that, indeed, 
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1. Introduction 
This article addresses an unexplored consequence of inequality: its implications for 
culture and social capital formation. A society suffering severe inequality may develop 
social and political apathy. If the situation persists for a long time, this apathy becomes a 
cultural trait hindering the creation of social capital. By putting forward and testing this 
hypothesis we contribute to the debates on the consequences of long-term inequality (e.g., 
Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Easterly, 2007; Galor et al., 2009) and the causes of culture, 
and more particularly, of social capital (e.g., Nunn 2012; Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Guiso 
et al., 2016). 
We focus on the effects of historical persistent inequality –in short persistent inequality–, 
which refers to a type of inequality that persists over a long historical period. This 
persistence makes inequality a feature of society that can create cultural traits. As part of a 
society’s culture, social capital can be undermined by persistent inequality. Arguably, an 
unequal society that, generations upon generations, excludes a large section of its population 
from having economic opportunities and acceptable living standards will hardly develop a 
strong sense of solidarity and commitment towards the common good. Once the cultural 
pattern has been created, it may persist even if society becomes more equal, thus 
constraining the potential for future economic growth. 
We test this hypothesis using municipal-level data on blood donation in the Southern 
Spanish region of Andalusia (see Fig. 1). This is a case in point because Andalusia has 
suffered highly persistent inequality over its modern history, whose roots are largely 
exogenous (Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 2016a, b). In addition, blood donation is 
collected in a centralized way by the Andalusian Health Service, which has provided us with 
a unique dataset on the number of donors per municipality. We find that land inequality –as 
a proxy for persistent inequality– has a non-negligible negative effect on blood donation, 
thus supporting the hypothesis that persistent inequality undermines social capital. 
Interestingly, it is historical inequality rather than current inequality which affects social 
capital, suggesting that the effect works through the creation of cultural patterns. 
2. Background and data 
Following Guiso et al. (2011), social capital refers to “those persistent and shared beliefs 
and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially 
valuable activities” (p. 419). We measure social capital through blood donation, which is 
widely considered to be a good proxy (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011; Nannicini et al., 2013). The 
Andalusian Health Service has provided us with a unique dataset containing the postal code 
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of every person that has donated blood in any year of the period 2012-2014. Using this 
information and data on the population in age to donate blood (i.e., between 18 and 65), we 
create the variable “percentage of blood donors” at the municipal level. It is worth noting 
that blood donors’ data comes from an ad hoc extraction from administrative files conducted 
specifically for this study, and postal codes may contain errors. These errors are amplified in 
small municipalities, for which the denominator of the indicator is smaller. In addition, 
inhabitants of small municipalities have less access to blood collection units. Consequently, 
to reduce measurement errors we exclude municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants in 
2014, which only account for 1% of the Andalusian population. Fig. 2 depicts the Kernel 
density estimation of the distribution of the percentage of blood donors, which 
approximately follows a normal distribution slightly skewed to the right. To mitigate the 
influence of high values, we limit them to the 99th percentile (20.2%). 
Our indicator of persistent inequality comes from the 1982 agricultural census and 
measures the percentage of utilized agricultural area in holdings with 200 hectares or more, 
computed considering only private agricultural holdings. This is a good proxy for historical 
persistent inequality because it reflects the incidence of latifundia in the municipality. Land 
concentration has been endemic in large parts of the Spanish and Andalusian geography, and 
can be traced back to the way land was colonized in the Middle Ages. Factors affecting land 
distribution in the remote past were contingent and exogenous to the development path of 
each territory (Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 2016a, b). Fig. 3 provides some evidence on 
the persistence of land concentration throughout the 20th century in our sample of 
municipalities. Correlations are remarkably high, particularly bearing in mind that the 
indicators are not directly comparable. Tables A1 and A2 (Supplementary Material) provide 
the definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
The persistent inequality suffered by municipalities characterized by high land 
concentration may have shaped the local culture and undermined social capital. The 
miserable living conditions of landless workers in Andalusia were pretty much those of a 
marginalized social group. Pablo de Olavide (1768/1996), Intendent of Seville in the second 
half of the 18th century, described them as “the unhappiest men that I know in Europe […] 
half-a-year laborers, and the other half beggars”. This situation of inequality and dependence 
on the landowner persisted well into the 20th century (Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 
2016a).  Arguably, a society that over a long period of time has suffered such high levels of 
inequality will not develop a sense of commitment towards the public good and solidarity 
among its members. Social groups such as landless workers that have been oppressed, 
marginalized, or simply placed in a systematic inferior position, are very unlikely to view 
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the state (or the society as a whole) as representing or sharing their own interests. This 
feeling of apathy, generations upon generations, leads to a culture of lack of trust, 
cooperation, or more broadly, social capital.  
Finally, an interesting aspect of land inequality is that it was a very important determinant 
of overall economic inequality in the past, while its current relevance is much lower since 
agriculture only employs today a small fraction of the population (8.4% in Andalusia in 
2014 according to the Labor Force Survey). Thus, in historical and cultural terms the effect 
of land inequality can be interpreted as a cumulative effect over time, which creates cultural 
patterns. 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Baseline results 
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the bivariate regression of the percentage of blood donors in 
2014 on land concentration in 1982. The coefficient is negative and highly statistically 
significant, which provides initial support for our hypothesis. Column 2 adds two 
demographic factors that are relevant to explain blood donation, namely, total population 
and population’s average age (in linear and quadratic terms), while column 3 includes 
geographic indicators such as a coast dummy, distance to the capital city (linear and 
squared), and a capital city dummy. In both cases the coefficient on land concentration 
remains negative and statistically significant. Column 4 adds additional geographic controls 
that may influence both blood donation and land concentration (altitude, ruggedness, soil 
quality, rainfall, and average temperature). This is our baseline specification. The coefficient 
on land inequality is large and precisely estimated. Going from a municipality without large 
estates (0% in land concentration) to a municipality with a high concentration of land (90%) 
decreases blood donors by almost 2 percentage points (i.e., (90-0)*(-0.022)= -1.98). 
The next two columns show that the result does not depend on a specific variable of land 
concentration. Column 6 employs the percentage of land in holdings equal to or greater than 
200 hectares from the 1962 agricultural census, while column 7 uses the percentage of land 
in holdings greater than 250 hectares from cadastral data in 1930. The results obtained with 
these alternative measures are very similar to the baseline findings. This is as expected since 
land distribution has remained largely unchanged over time. 
3.2. A two-stage least squared (2SLS) framework 
Following our previous work (Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 2016a, b), we argue that 
land inequality can be largely considered as an exogenous factor due to the way the territory 
was colonized in the Middle Ages after the Christian conquest. This fact makes us confident 
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that the uncovered negative effect of persistent inequality on social capital is not driven by 
reverse causality or omitted variables. To further pursue this issue, this section explicitly 
exploits the fact that Andalusia was divided during the Middle Ages by a frontier that ceased 
to exist in 1492 when the Catholic Monarchs conquered the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada 
(see Fig. 1). The Castilian part of Andalusia was colonized under the conditions of an 
insecure frontier region, which led to the concentration of land in the hands of the military 
elite, i.e., the nobility. In contrast, once conquered, the former Nasrid Kingdom of Granada 
was colonized under very different premises, that is, as a secure region, with land 
distribution evolving in a relatively more equal way (see details in Oto-Peralías and 
Romero-Ávila, 2016b). Since the territory close to the frontier is geographically very similar 
(as shown in Table 2 in Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 2016b), we can use this historical 
accident as a source of exogenous variation in persistent inequality within a 2SLS 
framework. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 employ the whole sample, while columns 3 and 4 focus on 
municipalities within 25 km of the frontier. The instrument is a dummy variable capturing 
whether the municipality belonged to the Castilian part of Andalusia in the Middle Ages. 
This variable exerts a strong positive effect on land concentration, thereby indicating that it 
is a relevant instrument. The second stage, which uses only that part of land concentration 
that is due to the frontier dummy, reports a large, negative, and highly significant coefficient. 
The increase in the size of the effect suggests that the OLS estimates are downward biased. 
Moreover, it could suggest that the exclusion restriction does not hold. In this regard, one 
possible interpretation is that, as documented in Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2016b), the 
frontier of Granada also affected the concentration of political power by the nobility. Thus, 
if we consider the second-stage coefficient on land concentration to be capturing inequality 
in a broad sense (both in economic and political terms), this would also justify its larger 
effect. Notwithstanding, due to lack of data on other potential channels, it is impossible to 
test whether the frontier has only affected social capital through persistent inequality. 
Therefore, we cannot assure that persistent inequality is the only channel through which the 
presence of the frontier of Granada affected social capital, but it is likely to be the dominant 
one. All in all, this 2SLS exercise provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
persistent inequality undermines social capital. 
3.3. Additional robustness checks 
Our reading of the results is that persistent inequality –proxied by land concentration– 
contributes to create a culture of low cooperation and low commitment towards the common 
good, which means low social capital. Therefore, this implies that persistent inequality has 
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direct cultural implications. An alternative interpretation would be that persistent inequality 
harms economic development in the long-run, with poorer communities ending up with less 
social capital. This would imply an indirect effect working through economic development. 
We try to address this issue by adding proxies for income to our baseline model. Columns 1 
to 4 of Table 3 control for the percentage of population with secondary and higher education, 
the average number of vehicles per household, average socio-economic condition, and 
average gross income. All these variables enter with a positive coefficient, which is 
statistically significant only in column 3. Reassuringly, the coefficient on land concentration 
remains unchanged. 
One may also wonder whether it is current inequality, rather than historical inequality, 
what matters. Current inequality can be measured through income inequality in 2007. Data 
on this variable at the local level is seldom available. For the Spanish case, there are data 
available for municipalities larger than 5,000 inhabitants (Hortas-Rico and Onrubia, 2014). 
Column 5 estimates our baseline model with this smaller sample of municipalities. The 
coefficient on land concentration is larger, which is likely due to the fact that measurement 
errors in the dependent variable diminish as municipality size increases. Column 6 includes 
an income Gini index, which enters with a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. 
Column 7 includes both inequality variables. Remarkably, the coefficient on persistent 
inequality (i.e., land concentration) remains negative and significant, while that on current 
inequality is again insignificant. 
Finally, our findings are also robust to: i) correcting standard errors for spatial 
dependence; ii) trimming values of the percentage of blood donors at the 95th percentile 
(rather than at the 99th); iii) applying different cutoffs of municipalities’ population; and iv) 
using electoral turnout as an alternative indicator of social capital (see Supplementary 
Material for details). 
4. Conclusions 
This letter advances and tests the hypothesis that persistent inequality undermines social 
capital. Using data on blood donors as a proxy for social capital, and land concentration as a 
measure of persistent inequality, our municipal-level analysis finds support for this 
hypothesis. Land inequality exerts a non-negligible negative effect on the percentage of 
blood donors, which is robust to the inclusion of a wide array of demographic and 
geographic controls. The effect is also robust to controlling for several proxies for income, 
which suggests that our findings are not driven by the fact that inequality negatively affects 
economic growth. In addition, we find that what matters is historical inequality rather than 
current (income) inequality. This is consistent with the fact that once the cultural trait is 
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created, it may persist even if society becomes more equal. In all, the evidence provided 
sheds new light into the debates on the consequences of inequality and the determinants of 
culture. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.017*** -0.014** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Land concentration in 1962 -0.015***
(0.005)
Land concentration in 1930 -0.02***
(0.005)
Population -0.04*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Population squared 56.945*** 33.427*** 31.325*** 32.554*** 57.143***
(10.756) (8.885) (9.022) (8.998) (10.144)
Population's average age 3.256*** 2.544*** 2.112*** 2.005*** 1.601**
(0.622) (0.615) (0.613) (0.628) (0.707)
Population's average age squared -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.018**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Coast dummy -2.708*** -2.27*** -2.24*** -2.417***
(0.278) (0.366) (0.381) (0.414)
Distance to capital city 4.516** 5.487*** 4.965** 5.793**
(1.792) (1.988) (2.002) (2.28)
Distance to capital city squared -2.464 -3.554** -3.22* -4.123**
(1.583) (1.773) (1.775) (1.969)
Capital city dummy 2.834** 3.132** 3.005** 2.197*
(1.356) (1.413) (1.463) (1.272)
Altitude 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ruggedness -0.003* -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Soil quality 0.028 -0.091 0.028
(0.25) (0.266) (0.283)
Rainfall 0.149* 0.13 0.061
(0.085) (0.083) (0.115)
Average temperature 0.09 0.077 0.14
(0.187) (0.188) (0.211)
R -squared 0.01 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24
Obs. 570 570 570 570 569 509
The effect of land concentration on blood donation: Baseline results
Table 1
Dependent variable is the percentage of blood donors
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are
estimated by OLS. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and
1% level, respectively.
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First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.109*** -0.164**
(0.038) (0.081)
Castilian part of Andalusia 11.744*** 8.802***
(1.951) (2.839)
Demographic and geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
F -stat of the instrument 36.220 9.613
Partial R -squared 0.050 0.060
R -squared 0.219 0.292
Obs. 570 570 167 167
Table 2
The effect of land concentration on blood donation: A 2SLS exercise
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All
regressions are estimated by 2SLS. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted
for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Whole sample Within 25 km of the 
Frontier
Dependent variable in the second stage is the percentage of blood donors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Education level (2001) 0.009
(0.016)
0.15
(1.155)
3.028*
(1.751)
Average gross income (2013) 0.79
(0.703)
Income Gini index (2007) -1.367 -3.034
(2.771) (2.578)
Demographic and geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R -squared 0.240 0.24 0.240 0.240 0.400 0.370 0.41
Obs. 569 569 569 570 234 236 234
Table 3
Robustness to alternative interpretations
Dependent variable is the percentage of blood donors
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are estimated by OLS. The
estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Average number of vehicles per 
household (2001)
Average socio-economic condition 
(2001)
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Fig. 2. Kernel density of the percentage of blood donors
Note: The vertical line reflects the value at which values are trimmed in the analysis 
(the 99th percentile).
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Table A1. Description of variables. 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Table A3. Replication of Table 1 with standard errors corrected for spatial 
dependence. 
 
Table A4. Replication of Table 1 with values of the percentage of blood donors 
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Table A5. Baseline model for different cutoffs of municipalities’ population. 
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Variable Description Source
Altitude Average altitude in meters, computed using GIS 
software.
Authors’ elaboration using 
geo-referenced data from 
Hijmans et al. (2005).
Average gross income Logarithm of ‘gross personal income divided by the 
population aged between 18 and 65 years’. The 
informacion is collected from tax returns of the income 
tax of individuals (IRPF). The year of measurement is 
2013.
Agencia Estatal de 
Administración Tributaria. 
Estadística de los 
declarantes del IRPF por 
municipios.
Average number of 
vehicles per household
Number of vehicles (cars and vans) for personal 
transport owned by households, divided by the number 
of households. The year of measurement is 2001.
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE). Censos 
de Población y Viviendas 
2001.
Average 
socioeconomic 
condition
Average of class marks of socioeconomic conditions of 
individuals, combining information from occupation, 
activity and professional situation. To illustrate the 
construction of this variable, a (maximum) class mark 
of 3 is given to non-agricultural entrepreneurs with 
employees, and a (minimun) class mark of 0 to those 
unemployed who have not worked previously. Year 
2001.
INE. Censos de Población 
y Viviendas 2001.
Average temperature Annual average temperature (in degrees Celsius). Authors’ elaboration using 
geo-referenced data from 
Instituto de Estadística y 
Cartografía de Andalucía 
(IECA) (2014a).
Capital city dummy Dummy variable capturing whether the municipality is 
the capital city of the province
Authors’ elaboration.
Castilian part of 
Andalusia
Dummy variable indicating whether the municipality 
belonged to the Castilian part of Andalusia.
Oto-Peralías and Romero-
Ávila (2016b).
Coast dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the municipality 
has access to the coast.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to capital city Linear distance between the centroid of the 
municipality and its capital city (in hundreds km), 
computed using GIS software.
Authors’ elaboration.
Education level Percentage of population with secondary or higher 
education. Year 2001.
INE. Censos de Población 
y Viviendas 2001.
Income Gini index Gini index corresponding to the distribution of the gross 
personal income in 2007.
Hortas-Rico y Onrubia 
(2014).
Table A1
Description of variables
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Variable Description Source
Land concentration in 
1930
Percentage of land in holdings greater than 250 hectares 
in 1930, from cadastral data. Due to data availability, 
this indicator considers all types of land.
Carrión (1975).
Land concentration in 
1962
Percentage of land in holdings greater than 200 
hectares, measured in 1962. Due to data availability, 
this indicator considers all types of land (i.e., the whole 
census area).
1962 agricultural census 
(INE).
Land concentration in 
1982
Percentage of UAA in holdings equal to or greater than 
200 hectares of UAA, in 1982. We focus on private 
agricultural holdings (with legal status of natural person 
or company), which represent 95% of total UAA.
Authors’ elaboration using 
the 1982 agricultural census 
(INE).
Land concentration in 
1982 (Panel A of 
Figure 3)
For comparison purposes with "land concentration in 
1930", this variable measures the percentage of land in 
holdings equal to or greater than 250 hectares in 1982. 
All types of land are considered.
Authors’ elaboration using 
the 1982 agricultural census 
(INE).
Percentage of blood 
donors
Number of blood donors divided by the population 
aged between 18 and 65 years, which is the age at 
which an individual is eligible to donate blood. A person 
is considered a blood donor if he/she has donated blood 
in any year of 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Authors’ elaboration using 
data from the Andalusian 
Health Service (Centro 
Regional de Transfusión 
Sanguínea of Seville) and 
INE (Padrón Municipal).
Population Total population of the municipality (in thousands). Its 
squared term is expressed in millions. Year 2014.
INE. Padrón Municipal.
Population's average 
age
Average age of the population. Year 2014. INE. Padrón Municipal.
Rainfall Annual precipitation. It is expressed in hundreds of 
millimeters.
Authors’ elaboration using 
geo-referenced data from 
IECA (2014a).
Ruggedness Standard deviation of altitude in meters, computed 
using GIS software.
Authors’ elaboration using 
geo-referenced data from 
Hijmans et al. (2005).
Soil quality Indicator of soil quality calculated as: 4*(% surface area 
with excellent soil capacity) + 3*(% surface area with 
good soil capacity) + 2*(% surface area with moderate 
soil capacity) + 1*(% surface area with marginal soil 
capacity), with values ranging from 1 (low soil quality) 
to 4 (excellent soil quality). It is computed using GIS 
software.
Consejería de Medio 
Ambiente. Junta de 
Andalucía (1996).
Turnout in general 
elections
Average turnout in general elections during the period 
1989-2011.
Authors’ elaboration using 
data from IECA (2014b).
Table A1
Description of variables (Continued )
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Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Variables are available at www.ine.es
Instituto de Estadística y Cartografía de Andalucía, 2014a. Datos Espaciales de Referencia de Andalucía. 
Available at http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/institutodeestadisticaycartografia/
Carrión, P. 1975. Los Latifundios en España. Su importancia, Origen, Consecuencias y Solución . 
Barcelona: Ariel.
Hortas-Rico, M. and Onrubia, J. 2014. “Renta personal de los municipios españoles y su distribución: 
metodología de estimación a partir de microdatos tributarios”, Estudios sobre la Economía Española 2014-
12, FEDEA.
Oto-Peralías, D. and Romero-Ávila D. 2016b.  “Historical Frontiers and the Rise of Inequality. The Case of 
the Frontier of Granada”, Journal of the European Economic Association , forthcoming.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Altitude 572 493.56 371.92 2.02 1878.49
Average gross income 572 2.23 0.22 1.62 3.01
Average number of vehicles per 
household 571 0.85 0.16 0.42 1.44
Average socioeconomic condition 571 0.78 0.09 0.55 1.06
Average temperature 572 15.40 1.75 8.59 19.00
Capital city dummy 572 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Castilian part of Andalusia 572 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
Coast dummy 572 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Distance to capital city 572 0.44 0.26 0.00 1.34
Education level 571 46.45 10.55 13.00 82.00
Income Gini index 236 0.45 0.04 0.20 0.61
Land concentration in 1930 509 34.79 26.93 0.00 100.00
Land concentration in 1962 569 40.11 26.61 0.00 99.58
Land concentration in 1982 570 17.36 20.93 0.00 88.28
Land concentration in 1982 
(Panel A of Figure 3) 570 37.25 28.36 0.00 99.89
Percentage of blood donors 572 7.55 3.46 0.42 20.18
Population 572 14.51 45.73 1.00 696.68
Population's average age 572 41.49 3.52 32.84 52.99
Rainfall 572 6.70 1.95 2.00 18.47
Ruggedness 572 125.02 114.26 0.61 893.33
Soil quality 572 1.99 0.67 1.00 4.00
Turnout in general elections 570 77.94 5.48 57.52 90.07
Descriptive statistics
Table A2
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.017* -0.014* -0.022** -0.022**
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.01]
Land concentration in 1962 -0.015***
[0.006]
Land concentration in 1930 -0.02***
[0.006]
Population -0.04*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.032***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.01]
Population squared 56.945*** 33.427*** 31.325*** 32.554** 57.143***
[12.334] [11.469] [11.975] [12.709] [15.334]
Population's average age 3.256*** 2.544** 2.112** 2.005** 1.601
[1.133] [0.996] [0.863] [0.846] [1.061]
Population's average age squared -0.036*** -0.029** -0.024** -0.023** -0.018
[0.014] [0.012] [0.011] [0.01] [0.013]
Coast dummy -2.708*** -2.27*** -2.24*** -2.417***
[0.417] [0.537] [0.563] [0.566]
Distance to capital city 4.516 5.487* 4.965* 5.793*
[3.041] [2.86] [2.823] [3.175]
Distance to capital city squared -2.464 -3.554 -3.22 -4.123
[2.607] [2.467] [2.453] [2.65]
Capital city dummy 2.834* 3.132** 3.005** 2.197
[1.466] [1.497] [1.461] [1.55]
Altitude 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ruggedness -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Soil quality 0.028 -0.091 0.028
[0.266] [0.266] [0.267]
Rainfall 0.149 0.13 0.061
[0.099] [0.091] [0.121]
Average temperature 0.09 0.077 0.14
[0.229] [0.235] [0.25]
R -squared 0.01 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24
Obs. 570 570 570 570 569 509
Table A3
Replication of Table 1 with standard errors corrected for spatial dependence
Dependent variable is Percentage of blood donors
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are
estimated by OLS. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Conley's standard errors (i.e., corrected for spatial dependence) are in brackets. We employ cutoffs of 1
decimal degree, beyond which spatial correlation is assumed to be zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.015** -0.012** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Land concentration in 1962 -0.013***
(0.005)
Land concentration in 1930 -0.018***
(0.005)
Population -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Population squared 54.121*** 31.622*** 29.419*** 30.308*** 52.957***
(10.237) (8.424) (8.477) (8.397) (9.13)
Population's average age 2.917*** 2.346*** 2.005*** 1.923*** 1.424**
(0.571) (0.576) (0.579) (0.592) (0.678)
Population's average age squared -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Coast dummy -2.572*** -2.205*** -2.183*** -2.355***
(0.258) (0.335) (0.347) (0.379)
Distance to capital city 3.221** 4.247** 3.829** 4.398**
(1.565) (1.729) (1.742) (1.942)
Distance to capital city squared -1.534 -2.626* -2.352 -2.949*
(1.367) (1.531) (1.535) (1.686)
Capital city dummy 2.416* 2.635** 2.534* 1.719
(1.272) (1.29) (1.337) (1.156)
Altitude 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ruggedness -0.003* -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Soil quality 0.014 -0.092 0.02
(0.231) (0.246) (0.262)
Rainfall 0.106 0.091 0.025
(0.066) (0.065) (0.087)
Average temperature -0.024 -0.034 0.012
(0.16) (0.162) (0.182)
R -squared 0.01 0.2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
Obs. 570 570 570 570 569 509
Table A4
Replication of Table 1 with values of the percentage of blood donors trimmed at the 95th percentile 
(rather than at the 99th)
Dependent variable is Percentage of blood donors
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are
estimated by OLS. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and
1% level, respectively.
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All 
municipalities
> 500 
inhabitants
> 1,000 
inhabitants 
(Baseline)
> 2,000 
inhabitants
> 5,000 
inhabitants
> 10,000 
inhabitants
> 20,000 
inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.013** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.03*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Population -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.012** -0.007* -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Population squared 30.669*** 31.394*** 31.325*** 30.148*** 17.426** 10.693* 8.935
(9.334) (9.457) (9.022) (8.875) (7.162) (5.406) (6.621)
Population's average age 2.493*** 2.779*** 2.112*** 1.937*** 4.118*** 4.412*** 4.493
(0.572) (0.614) (0.613) (0.666) (1.113) (1.362) (2.729)
Population's average age squared -0.03*** -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.059
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.036)
Coast dummy -2.159*** -2.121*** -2.27*** -2.214*** -2.214*** -2.738*** -2.587***
(0.359) (0.372) (0.366) (0.352) (0.367) (0.418) (0.596)
Distance to capital city 7.701*** 7.595*** 5.487*** 6.379*** 4.754** 5.863** 2.648
(2.008) (2.061) (1.988) (2.026) (2.359) (2.54) (3.056)
Distance to capital city squared -5.232*** -5.489*** -3.554** -4.743*** -2.267 -5.189* -2.001
(1.771) (1.877) (1.773) (1.816) (2.225) (2.764) (3.17)
Capital city dummy 3.396** 3.322** 3.132** 3.013** 1.972 1.807 1.011
(1.354) (1.368) (1.413) (1.396) (1.226) (1.171) (1.341)
Altitude 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ruggedness -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.005** -0.006*** -0.002 0
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Soil quality 0.803*** 0.588** 0.028 -0.089 -0.249 -0.727** -0.825
(0.254) (0.25) (0.25) (0.239) (0.274) (0.332) (0.534)
Rainfall -0.007 0.035 0.149* 0.08 -0.094 0.077 0.079
(0.078) (0.088) (0.085) (0.096) (0.074) (0.07) (0.115)
Average temperature -0.037 -0.021 0.09 -0.031 -0.132 -0.491** -0.291
(0.173) (0.179) (0.187) (0.196) (0.205) (0.201) (0.302)
R -squared 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.39 0.49 0.49
Obs. 769 667 570 452 257 153 79
Table A5
Baseline model for different cutoffs of municipalities' population
Dependent variable is Percentage of blood donors
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are estimated by OLS. The
estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land concentration in 1982 -0.025** -0.02** -0.023** -0.023**
(0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Land concentration in 1962 -0.031***
(0.008)
Land concentration in 1930 -0.029***
(0.008)
Population -0.107*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.1***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Population squared 151.446***106.577***109.532***108.529***147.307***
(25.835) (15.815) (18.448) (18.014) (20.318)
Population's average age 4.453*** 3.774*** 4.42*** 4.334*** 4.474***
(1.002) (0.985) (1.004) (1.008) (1.291)
Population's average age squared -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Coast dummy -6.299*** -5.133*** -5.211*** -5.877***
(0.738) (0.891) (0.894) (0.948)
Distance to capital city 3.996 5.889** 5.592* 5.654*
(2.883) (2.952) (2.985) (3.256)
Distance to capital city squared -4.799* -6.318** -6.027** -6.773**
(2.482) (2.519) (2.506) (2.73)
Capital city dummy 10.109*** 10.736*** 10.644*** 7.681***
(2.045) (2.182) (2.288) (1.74)
Altitude 0.003** 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ruggedness -0.004* -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Soil quality 1.332*** 1.056** 1.442***
(0.413) (0.422) (0.445)
Rainfall -0.139 -0.144 -0.08
(0.101) (0.099) (0.129)
Average temperature 0.405 0.404 0.284
(0.265) (0.257) (0.284)
R -squared 0.01 0.19 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.37
Obs. 568 568 568 568 567 507
Table A6
An alternative indicator of social capital: Turnout in general elections
Dependent variable is Turnout in general elections (average period 1989-2011)
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1 (Supplementary Material). All regressions are
estimated by OLS. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and
1% level, respectively.
